Reflections on Liberation Without Domination and the OLA–Fano Alliance
Published Oct. 30, 2026, 4:39 a.m. by Zelalam Negassa
Akkam jirtu, jarana?
I found Dr. Hambisa Belina's article, “Liberation Without Domination: Ethiopia's Opposition Alliance and the Right to Decide,” a thoughtful and timely contribution to the discussion surrounding the recently announced opposition alliance.
His central argument—that liberation movements cannot legitimately determine a people's political future without their meaningful participation and consent—is important. I particularly appreciate his distinction between an organization's authority to enter an alliance and its authority to make fundamental political decisions on behalf of an entire people.
While I agree with much of Dr. Belina's analysis, I would like to examine more closely an important issue he also raises: the compatibility of the political objectives of the movements entering the alliance. Although he acknowledges the unresolved constitutional and territorial differences among the participating organizations, his discussion focuses primarily on political legitimacy and the people's right to decide. I believe the substantive nature of these potentially conflicting objectives, and whether they can realistically be reconciled, warrants further examination, particularly in light of historical experiences involving alliances between movements with competing political aspirations.
A common enemy does not necessarily mean a common political objective, much less a shared vision of the future.
This brings me to what I consider a critical question regarding the current alliance: Can movements whose fundamental political objectives may be incompatible establish a credible alliance without compromising the long-term aspirations of the peoples they claim to represent?
For example, if one movement considers Oromo self-determination and meaningful political autonomy fundamental objectives, as the OLA does, while another advocates constitutional or territorial arrangements that could conflict with those aspirations, as some Fano positions suggest, how are these differences to be reconciled?
Have the participating organizations reached substantive agreements on these matters, or have they simply deferred them in pursuit of their immediate common objective?
Deferring fundamental disagreements may serve short-term tactical interests, but it does not eliminate them. On the contrary, such contradictions may become even more consequential once the common adversary is removed and the former allies must determine how political authority, territory, and sovereignty will be organized.
Historical experiences relevant to Ethiopia, including the OLF–TPLF transitional cooperation of 1991–1992, illustrate that cooperation against a common adversary does not necessarily produce agreement on the subsequent distribution of political power.
Public Opposition and the Question of Accountability
Two additional dimensions of the current controversy deserve attention: the historical arguments advanced to justify the alliance and the responses of OLA representatives to public criticism.
1. The Attempt to Justify the Alliance Through the U.S.–Soviet Precedent
Some supporters of the OLA–Fano alliance have compared it to the U.S.–Soviet cooperation against Nazi Germany. The analogy may sound persuasive, but it does little to illuminate the actual issues at stake.
The United States and the Soviet Union were sovereign states cooperating against a common wartime adversary, not insurgent movements with potentially competing claims over sovereignty, territory, and constitutional authority within the same country. Nor did their cooperation resolve their fundamental differences; those contradictions reemerged after victory and fed decades of Cold War confrontation.
The relevant lesson is not that former adversaries can cooperate against a common enemy. That much is obvious. It is that such cooperation does not reconcile competing political objectives or guarantee a sustainable settlement afterward.
Consequently, the analogy offers little reassurance on the constitutional, territorial, and self-determination questions surrounding the OLA–Fano alliance.
2. Public Opposition and the Response of OLA Spokespersons
In my observation, the OLA–Fano alliance has generated an unprecedented degree of opposition, skepticism, and controversy among the Oromo public. I would go further and suggest that it appears substantially more unpopular than the OLF's participation in the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) in the mid-2000s. Although I am not aware of systematic polling that would quantify the difference, the level of public criticism and concern surrounding the present alliance strikes me as considerably greater.
This should not be dismissed as merely a public relations problem. When a liberation movement makes a consequential political decision that generates such widespread controversy among the people it claims to represent, the appropriate response should be explanation, consultation, and accountability, not dismissal.
What I find particularly troubling is the apparent suggestion by an OLA spokesperson that the alliance is “none of your business” to the very people the organization claims to be struggling to liberate. If that accurately represents the spokesperson's position, I find it mind-boggling.
How can a movement founded on the principle of a people's right to self-determination suggest that those same people have no business questioning decisions that could fundamentally affect their political future?
A genuinely people-centered liberation movement should welcome public scrutiny, explain its strategic decisions, and recognize that its legitimacy ultimately derives from the people it claims to represent—not simply from the authority of its leadership.
Frankly, some of the statements coming from the OLA's spokespersons remind me of the old saying, “Who needs enemies when you have friends like these?”
At a time when the organization needs to explain a highly controversial political decision and address legitimate public concerns, such remarks risk alienating the very people whose confidence and support it should be seeking.
At a minimum, this suggests that the OLA needs better spokespersons—individuals who understand that public communication is not simply about defending decisions already made, but about demonstrating respect, accountability, and responsiveness to the people on whose behalf the organization claims to struggle.
A liberation movement cannot credibly champion a people's right to decide while dismissing their right to question.
Political Compatibility, Popular Legitimacy, and Safeguards
Returning to Dr. Belina's central argument, I support the fundamental tests of political legitimacy, public accountability, and protection against domination that he advances. Building on his analysis, I believe three closely related questions deserve particular attention in assessing the OLA–Fano alliance, especially the substantive compatibility of the participating movements' political objectives and the safeguards necessary to address their differences.
First is political compatibility. Do the participating movements have sufficiently compatible visions of the future, particularly concerning self-determination, territorial claims, federalism, and constitutional authority? Where disagreements exist, have they established credible principles and mechanisms for resolving them?
Second is popular legitimacy. Who authorized these movements to make consequential political commitments, and how will the people themselves participate in determining their political future? Organizational leadership cannot substitute its judgment for the collective political will of the people.
Third is the existence of enforceable safeguards. What mechanisms will prevent a stronger alliance partner from dominating the others or imposing its preferred political settlement after their common objective has been achieved?
These questions do not imply that cooperation between movements with different political programs is inherently illegitimate or necessarily doomed to fail. Tactical cooperation may be justified under certain circumstances. However, its potential military effectiveness should not be confused with its political legitimacy or long-term viability.
I also agree with Dr. Belina that the right to self-determination must be applied consistently. The pursuit of freedom by one people cannot justify denying the corresponding rights of others, including minorities and individuals living within the territories concerned.
Ultimately, I believe the discussion surrounding the OLA–Fano alliance needs to move beyond whether the participating movements can cooperate to remove the current government.
The more consequential question is what happens afterward.
A liberation movement's success should not be measured solely by the government it helps defeat, but by whether the people it claims to represent emerge with greater freedom, security, political authority, and control over their own destiny.
Dr. Belina's article contributes significantly to this discussion by emphasizing the people's right to decide. I would build on that argument by examining more closely whether the participating movements' political objectives can be reconciled and whether the alliance has the legitimacy, accountability, and safeguards necessary to protect the interests of the peoples concerned.
An alliance may have an immediate strategic rationale and still lack a credible foundation for a just and sustainable political settlement.
And perhaps most importantly, Dr. Belina's article reminds us of a fundamental principle that every liberation movement must uphold: the people are not merely the beneficiaries of liberation; they are its rightful owners. Their voice is not an inconvenience to be managed, but the very foundation of the movement's legitimacy.
I share these reflections to encourage a more critical examination of the alliance's underlying assumptions, potential contradictions, and long-term implications.
Related Article: Liberation Without Domination: Ethiopia's Opposition Alliance and the Right to Decide
Similar posts:
STRONG CASES FOR AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF OROMIA
Godina Wallaggaa Bahaa Aanaa kiiramuu keessatti weerara Finxaaleyyii Amaaraa bananiin jiraattotni baadiyyaa beelladoota isaanii ooffatanii godaanaa jiru.
Hayyuu Oromoo gameessa Piroofeesar Mohaammad Hasaniif beekkamtiin kennamuuf jedha.
Safaariikoom babal'ina hojii Itoophiyaa fi keeniyaa keessaaf dolaara miiliyoona 300 liqeeffachuuf akka jiru barame.
0 comments
There are no comments yet.